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ABSTRACT 
Using the newly created, and in terms of coverage and detail, the most 
complete household income data from more than 130 countries, the 
paper analyzes the changes in the global income distribution between 
2008 and 2013. This was the period of the global financial crisis and 
recovery. It is shown that global inequality continued to decline, largely 
due to China’s growth that explains one-half of global Gini decrease 
between 2008 and 2013. Income growth of the global top 1 percent 
slowed significantly. The slowdown is present even after survey data are 
corrected for the likely underestimation of highest incomes. The paper 
ends with a discussion of the effects of the financial crisis in the light of 
an even more serious looming crisis caused by the 2019-20 pandemic. 
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Introduction 
 The Global Financial Crisis 2007-08 and its aftermath have had significant effects on income 
distribution in many countries (OECD 2011, 2015; Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2018; Cord et al, 2014; 
World Bank, 2016; Raitano 2016). It had no less significant effects on the global income distribution. It 
affected distributions within countries and the rates of growth of countries, which together determine 
changes in the global income distribution. Yet  so far the changes in the global income distribution after 
the financial crisis have not been studied. The objective of this paper is to fill that gap. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the data used in the calculation of 
the global income distribution in 2008 and 2013. Section 2 presents a descriptive analysis of global and 
regional changes in inequality and mean and median incomes between the two years. Section 3 focuses 
on the global growth incidence curves in several versions: anonymous and quasi non-anonymous (the 
term is explained below), balanced and unbalanced panel, and international (PPP) dollars and current US 
dollars. The essential features of the change in the global income distribution remain unaffected 
whatever version is chosen. Section 4 looks at how global income distribution and global growth 
incidence curve change when national top incomes are “corrected” because of  their likely 
underestimation by household surveys. Section 5 discusses developments in the relative positions of 
countries and “classes” (income percentiles2) in the global income distribution. By looking at individual 
country distributions, and at the positions of individual countries’ percentiles in the global income 
distribution, we are able to move away from a simplistic comparison of mean country incomes or GDPs 
per capita. Conclusions provide some thoughts on the evolution of the global inequality in the next 
decade. The paper was completed before the covid-19 pandemic, and the conclusions can only very 
imperfectly address the impact of this new crisis which is likely to be  substantial, even if contours can at 
the time of writing (June 2020), be only guessed.  
 
Section 1.  Data description  
a. Global coverage 
 In both 2008 and 2013, for all countries we use household-level (micro) data obtained from 
household surveys. Each country’s data are then “compressed” by creating one hundred percentiles of 
 
2 “Percentile” always refers to a given group of recipients. Thus, income of a given percentile always means the 
average income of recipients who belong to that percentile, not the threshold income for that percentile.   
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income distribution where individuals are ranked in (national) percentiles according to their household 
per capita disposable (after tax) income or household per capita consumption. Income or consumption 
are reported in national currencies which are converted into international or PPP consumption-based 
dollars3 derived from the 2011 International Comparison Project.4  It is important to underline that these 
are the most detailed extant global data, both in terms of country coverage, and thus population and 
GDP inclusion, as well as in terms of how finely-grained the data are (one hundred fractiles for each 
country). The data are thus much better than what we had up to now both in country coverage and 
distributional detail. This also obviates the need for approximations or interpolations using externally-
obtained data (i.e., outside household surveys) except in the case of the very top of national income 
distributions (discussed in Section 4). 
 Table 1 presents the most salient characteristics of the data. At the global level, we include 
between 94 and 96 percent of GDP and population. There are however important regional differences. 
While for rich countries (Western Europe, North  America and Oceania, WENAO) both their populations 
and income are almost fully included, African coverage, especially in terms of the continent’s GDP, is 
relatively low, at 79% in 2008 and 75% in 2013. In both years, the population coverage of Africa is also 
the lowest of all regions.  The reasons for that are obvious: Africa still lags in terms in terms of number 
and regularity of household surveys as well as researchers’ ability to access them. For example, some 
countries (e.g. Algeria) do not release micro data from household surveys. The lack of regularity is a 
problem in countries like Sudan and DR Congo which might have a survey in one year but then no 
information for a decade. Since in accordance with the previous work (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016), the 
surveys to be included in the database must not be more than two years off in either direction from the 
benchmark years of 2008 or 2013, the number of usable available African surveys is reduced. African 
countries tend to be poorer than the rest of the world (and those that lack regular surveys even more 
so), and it is thus likely that the less than compete coverage of Africa imparts a downward bias to the 
 
3 PPP dollars are consumption-based, that is they give the number of domestic currency units that are equal in 
purchasing power of consumption to the numeraire (1 US dollar in the United States). The new preliminary 2017 
PPPs were published in May 2020 (see World Bank, 2020). Since they fall outside the time frame of the study, I use 
the 2011 PPPs, which will also continue to be used by the World Bank in its estimates of world poverty.    
 
4 The exception are SILC (Survey of Income and Living Condition) surveys which report incomes for all European 
countries in euros. For each country we use its own price level (ratio between the euro-dollar nominal exchange 
rate and PPP dollars) to convert euros into PPP dollars.  
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calculated global inequality. For other regions,  as Table 1 makes clear, both the population and income 
(GDP) coverages are almost in all cases in excess of 90% and in most cases above 95%.    
 
Table 1. Coverage of countries, world population and GDP 
 Number of 
countries included 
Population covered 
by surveys (in 
million) 
Percent of total 
population covered 
Percent of total 
dollar GDP  
covered 
 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 
Africa 38 36 891 963 91 85 79 75 
Asia 29 26 3697 3944 95 96 89 89 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
18 19 540 599 94 98 95 98 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
27 26 371 362 92 88 99 91 
WENAO 24 24 849 876 100 100 100 99 
World 136 131 6347 6745 94 95 96 95 
Note: WENAO=Western Europe, North America and Oceania.  
To improve the precision and reliability of the data, in 2013 we also use Chinese, Indian and 
Indonesian data split into rural and urban areas with different PPPs, so that the official International 
Comparison Project PPPs are assumed to apply only to the urban areas, and a different (lower) price 
level is used for rural areas.5 The total number of countries is 136 in 2008 and 131 in 2013. This means 
that the database is composed of 3600 country/percentiles in 2008, and 3100 country/percentiles in 
2013 (or 3400 if we use rural/urban decompositions for China, India and Indonesia). These building 
blocks (country/percentiles) are used to create global percentiles where normally each global percentile 
is composed of percentiles from various countries. For example, the global top 1 percent will be 
dominated by country/percentiles from rich countries, and very low (poor) global percentiles will be 
populated by poor countries’ country/percentiles.  
The two most important sources of data are World Bank’s POVCAL and Luxembourg Income 
study (LIS). However, individual county surveys, SEDLAC database (for Latin America)  and SILC for some 
European countries are also used. The breakdown of sources in shown in  Annex 1.   
 
5 The difference between urban and rural price levels reflects the difference in the cost of the subsistence basket.  
This was also the approach used by Lakner and Milanovic (2015).  
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 There are two additional important types of information regarding the surveys that need to be 
mentioned: the breakdown between surveys that are consumption-based and those that use income, 
and the years when the surveys are conducted. Table 2 provides that information. Income and 
consumption surveys are split overall into half-and-half (with a slight preponderance of consumption-
based surveys in both years), but their regional distributions are very different. African surveys are 
almost all consumption-based. The only significant exception is South Africa which uses income surveys. 
About 2/3 of Asian surveys are consumption-based, while in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the shares 
of the two are about equal. However, in Asia, for the two most populous countries (China and India) we 
use income-based surveys. This is of particular relevance for India whose consumption-based surveys 
(National Sample Survey) have generated an intense debate as its results have been increasingly at  odds 
from those obtained from the national accounts.6 This is why for both years we use more reliable Indian 
income surveys. Finally, almost all Latin American and Caribbean, and WENAO surveys are income-
based.  
In an important work which “converted” consumption surveys into income surveys (and the 
reverse) based on the estimated relationship between fractiles from the surveys that had both 
consumption and income data, Jayadev, Lahoti and Reddy (2015) do not find that combining income- 
and consumption-based surveys imparts a bias to the world-wide estimates of inequality. While it would 
be desirable to have surveys from all countries use the same “measuring rod” (income or consumption) 
and use the same statistical framework and income definitions (as for example LIS does ex post, and SILC 
ex ante), we are currently far from that objective. Table 2 also shows that ¾ of the surveys are 
conducted in the benchmark year or within one year before or after the benchmark year.7 
  
 
6 For the early debate, see Deaton and Kozel (2005) and CSO (2008). The most recent 2017-18 “thick” round of NSS  
was withdrawn from the public use in 2019 because of “questionable quality of data”. This generated intense 
discussion as some its preliminary results had previously been leaked (see Subramanian, 2019). 
 
7 For the surveys not conducted in the benchmark year, we adjust the data by the consumer price index between 
the survey year and the benchmark year.  
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Table 2. Description of household surveys used 
 Number of 
consumption-
based surveys 
Number of income-
based surveys 
Number of surveys 
conducted in the 
benchmark year or 
+/- one year 
 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 
Africa 35 33 3 2 23 18 
Asia 20 21 9 10 20 24 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
0 1 18 18 17 19 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
16 12 11 12 27 22 
WENAO 0 1 24 23 23 23 
World 71 68 65 65 109 106 
 
b. How good are the surveys? 
The issue of how well household survey data cover the entirety of national income or consumption 
distribution has recently gained in importance due to the growing realization that in surveys top 
incomes are often underestimated (see Yonzan, Milanovic, Morelli and Gornick, forthcoming). This has 
led to the discussion of various ways in which the top of the income distribution may be adjusted by 
combining survey and fiscal data (Atkinson and Jenkins, 2020; Eckerstropher et al. 2016; Blanchet et al. 
2018; Lustig, 2020; Blanchet, Fournier and Piketty, 2017; Goda and Sanchez 2017). Obviously, such 
approaches are easier to implement in the case of single countries, and especially so if reliable tax data 
exist, than at the global level. In Section 4, we present one such possible global adjustment.  
However, it is important also to establish how closely the results from household surveys correlate 
with information that we have from national accounts. Table 3 shows, at regional levels, the ratio 
between income or consumption from surveys and household final consumption from national 
accounts, as well as a comparison of average per capita growth rates from surveys with comparable 
growth rates from national accounts.  In both cases, the underlying variables are expressed in nominal 
US dollars in order to avoid potential problems of different PPPs used in household surveys and national 
accounts. The data are population or income weighted (whatever weighting is appropriate), that is, they 
represent weighted averages for each region.  
In both years, household surveys (HS) account for about ¾ of household final consumption reported 
in national accounts (NA). We do not expect that they would account for one hundred percent since 
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household final consumption in national accounts also includes consumption of NGOs, imputed 
consumption from housing (which is omitted in many surveys), and consumption of institutionalized 
population (homes for the elderly, prisons, student boarding homes) that is not covered by surveys. In 
the United States, for example, the ratio between income from Current Population Surveys and NA 
consumption is around 75% in both years.  The percentages vary between the regions. In Asia and 
WENAO, they are the highest (between 75% and 90%), and in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well 
as in Africa in 2013) they are the lowest (around 60%). The low ratio in Latin America can be related to 
high inequality and likely non-participation or underestimation of income among the richest part of the 
population (for an early meta-study see Székely and Hilgert, 1999).  While there is only a mild tendency 
for underestimation to go down with higher measured inequality (see Figure 1), the majority of Latin 
American countries are below the regression line implying that their HS/NA ratios are less than what we 
would expect.8 On the other hand, India, for which we are using income surveys, and whose 
consumption-based survey first highlighted the rising discrepancy between surveys and national 
accounts is doing relatively well with the coverage of 47% in 2008 and 61% in 2013.9 China’s surveys’ 
coverage is slightly above 100% in both years (115% in 2008 and 114% in 2013).  
When it comes to the rate of (cumulative) income growth between 2008 and 2013, surveys and 
national accounts produce very similar results except in Africa, where  GDP per capita (over the sample 
of countries included in surveys) shows a growth of 31% vs. only 9% according to the surveys.  In all 
other cases, the differences are quite small, and the ranking of regions by the rate of growth is the same 
whether measured by GDP per capita or survey per capita income.  It is worth noting that the slowest 
growing region (that of rich countries) shows a 2% growth between 2008 and 2013 according to GDP per 
capita but a negative 4% growth according to surveys. 
  
 
8 Note that underreporting at the top would only lower the ratio between the mean income (consumption) in 
surveys over mean consumption from national accounts, but would not necessarily affect the Gini coefficient (if 
distributions are approximately lognormal; see Deaton, 2003). Thus, the HS/NA ratio vs. Gini relationship in Figure 
1 is meaningful.   
 
9 But as Subramanian (2019) has recently argued, it could be that the low HS/NA ratios in India are due to 
overestimation of GDP and national consumption, not the product of deteriorating quality of Indian household 
surveys.   
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Table 3. Comparison of household surveys and national accounts 
 Total income (consumption) from 
surveys to household final 
consumption from national accounts 
(in percent) 
Mean per capita income growth 2008-
2013 (cumulative, in percent) 
 2008 2013 Surveys National accounts 
(GDP per capita) 
Africa 79 59 9 31 
Asia 90 87 41 40 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 63 61 32 28 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 66 65 19 12 
WENAO 82 75 -4 2 
World 75 75 11 13 
Note: Income (consumption) from household surveys and consumption from NA are both measured in 
nominal dollar amounts; the same for the growth rates. The calculations are always done for all countries included 
in the surveys (full non-balanced sample). The ratios are regional population or income weighted averages.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Coverage of household final consumption by household surveys (HN/NA ratio) 
and Gini coefficient 
 
Note: Latin American and Caribbean countries are highlighted. HS=household survey; NA=national 
accounts. 
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2. Main results 
a. Tectonic shifts 
Table 4 shows that regional inequalities (inequality across all individuals of a given region), 
measured by both Gini and Theil indexes, have barely changed. In four regions (WENAO, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa) Ginis are the same (or one Gini point off) 
in 2013 as in 2008; only in Asia, is Gini 4 points lower in 2013. The same result obtains if we use Theil 
index. The ranking by regional inequalities has only slightly changed. Historically, Asia has been the most 
heterogeneous continent (see Milanovic, 2002). This is no longer exactly the case because its regional 
Gini of 55 is the same as Africa’s. Latin American inequality is slightly less, at 52, while Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, and WENAO have substantially lower regional inequalities of around 40 Gini points.   
However, global inequality decreased by 4.8 Gini points or 15 Theil points.10 The lack of changes 
in inter-personal regional inequalities (except in Asia) already suggests that the main source of change in 
global inequality is not to be found in within-national inequality changes, nor even in significant within-
regional convergence, but in the changes in the relative positions of regions, that is in between regional 
convergence.  It is noticeable (Table 4) that the richest region, WENAO, has practically not grown 
between 2008 and 2013 whereas the second poorest (and the most populous) region, Asia, has seen its 
mean income increase by almost 50%. It is this type of convergence (the “rising Asia”) which is, as we 
shall see in the next section, the main reason behind the rather dramatic decline in global inequality 
after the financial crisis. The same is confirmed by looking at median regional incomes: in Asia, the 
median income has risen by 76% while in the “rich world” it has gone up by only 6%.  
While the ranking of regions by mean income has not changed, Asia has moved much closer to 
the three richer regions and pulled further away from Africa. In effect, if we use the richest region 
(WENAO) as the numeraire all other four regions have become closer (in relative terms) to the rich 
world. It is these “tectonic” shifts (driven by differential growth rates of individual countries) that are 
determining the changes in the global income distribution. 
   
 
10 When incomes are measured in US dollars, the global Gini decreased  from 77.5  to 73.7 (less than 4 Gini points), 
Theil(0) went from 149.0 to 120.8. 
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Table 4. Regional and global inequality; regional and global median and mean income 
 Gini (in %) Theil0 (in %) Median income 
(in PPP dollars) 
 Mean income 
(in PPP dollars) 
 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 Change 
in % 
2008 2013 Change 
in % 
Africa 55 55 56 54 803 937 17 1403 1702 21 
Asia 59 55 66 56 1252 2202 76 2675 3974 49 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
53 52 53 50 2514 3274 30 4198 5232 25 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
41 41 29 29 4010 5652 41 5345 7662 43 
WENAO 41 40 31 30 14058 14935 6 18807 18992 1 
World 66.4 61.6 91 76 1674 2708 62 4817 5919 23 
Note: PPP dollars based on 2011 International Comparison Project results. Calculations of Gini and Theil are made 
for household per capita disposable income (or consumption) expressed in PPP dollars. Theil index used is Theil(0) 
or mean log deviation.  
 
 
b. Within-national inequalities 
 
 The other component which determines the evolution of global income inequality is within-
national inequalities. As Table 5 shows, in almost 3/5 of the countries for which we have inequality data 
in both 2008 and 2013, there was no salient change in inequality. (A “salient” change, or at least the 
change that we believe is real because small changes can be due to the variability of sampling,  is, 
following Aaberge, Atkinson and Modalsli (2017), considered to be at least 3 Gini points in either 
direction). Among the rest, in 32 countries there was a decline in inequality and in 20 countries an 
increase. In calculations of global inequality, inequality changes in populous countries (like China which 
registered a decrease in within-national inequality) will play a bigger role. Still given that almost 3/5 of 
the countries did not have a significant change in inequality and that the others are split relatively 
evenly between those with an inequality increase and those with a decrease, there is no a priori 
expectation that changing national inequalities might have played an important role in driving global 
inequality. This is not unexpected because national inequalities move slowly and for them to have a 
perceptible effect on global inequality we normally need to use a time-horizon in excess of five years. 
 When it comes to the regional distribution of inequality changes, it is remarkable that in more 
unequal regions (especially so in Latin America) inequality declines outstripped inequality increases. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, significant declines were registered by 8 countries and none showed 
an increase. (Note however that the countries that experienced a decrease in inequality are relatively 
small while the “giants” like Brazil and Mexico display stable inequalities). On the other hand, in the 
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most equal regions (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and WENAO), inequality increases outnumber 
inequality declines. This is very obvious in WENAO where the ratio is 5 to 1, and two big countries (Spain 
and Italy) are among those with substantial inequality increases.  
Figure 2 shows that the decreases were indeed more common (dots below the 45-degree line) 
among countries that had high Ginis in 2008. There is thus a convergence of country Ginis. 
Figure 2. Gini coefficients in 2008 and 2013 
 
Note: Dots below the 45-degree line imply that a counry’s Gini is less in 2013 than in 2008.  
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Table 5. Within-national income changes, 2008 to 2013 
 Countries with Gini… 
 Increases (>3 Gini points) Decreases (greater, in 
absolute terms, than 3 Gini 
points) 
No change 
Africa Burundi 
Cameroon  
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Mozambique  
Nigeria 
(7 countries) 
Burkina Faso 
Botswana 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Guinea 
Gambia 
Liberia 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Tunisia 
South Africa 
(11 countries) 
13 countries 
Asia Seychelles 
Taiwan 
(2 countries) 
China 
Fiji 
Iran 
Iraq 
Mongolia 
Malaysia 
Thailand  
Timor Leste 
(8 countries) 
13 countries 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
0 Bolivia  
Dominical Republic 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Peru 
El Salvador 
Uruguay 
(8 countries) 
10 countries 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
Armenia 
Estonia 
Montenegro 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
(6 countries) 
Kyrghyz Republic 
Kosovo 
Macedonia 
Romania 
(4 countries) 
 
16 countries 
WENAO Austria 
Cyprus 
Spain  
Italy 
Luxembourg 
(5 countries) 
Iceland 
(1 country) 
18 countries 
World 20 32 70 
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c. Decomposing the change in global inequality 
As already implied by regional convergence (namely, of all regions with respect to the richest, 
WENAO), the decline in global inequality was driven by the between-country component, that is by the 
decrease in inequality between mean country incomes. Using Gini decomposition, we find that the 
between component was reduced by 5.2 points; using Theil(0), we find a reduction of 11 Theil points 
(Table 6).  
The within-component (the part of global inequality due to the sum of inequalities within 
nations) was 4.1 points less when using Theil index. This was principally caused by the decreasing 
inequality in China. The within-component proper of the Gini coefficient is often very small because it is 
the sum of the double-weighted individual Gini coefficients.11 As we can see in Table 6, it was practically 
unchanged between 2008 and 2013. But what was interesting is the increase in the overlap component 
of the Gini which is sensitive to the  mass of population with “overlapping” incomes, that is populations 
of mean-poorer countries whose individual incomes are higher than individual incomes of people from 
mean-richer countries. That this component has gone up clearly implies that the correlation between 
one’s county and one’s individual income has become less strong. This is an important effect brought 
about by the global  convergence of mean country incomes.12 
  
 
11 In the within-national component of overall Gini each country Gini is weighted by the product of county’s 
population and income share.   
 
12 The third variable that could theoretically explain the change is variation in population. But obviously such 
population changes between countries over a five-year interval are very modest. If we calculate 2013 Gini with the 
population shares of 2008, the results are practically the same as with 2013 population shares.   
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Table 6. Decomposition of the change in global inequality between 2008 and 2013 
 2008 2013 Change 
Gini    
Between country 
component 
55.7 50.5 -5.2 
Within country 
component  
2.3 1.6 -0.7 
Overlap term 8.4 9.5 +1.1 
Total Gini 66.4 61.6 -4.8 
    
Theil(0)    
Between country 
component 
56.3 45.3 -11.0 
Within country 
component 
34.7 30.6 -4.1 
Total Theil(0) or mean 
log deviation  
91.0 75.9 -15.1 
 
 One expects that China had played an important role in the global decrease of inequality 
between 2008 and 2013. The question is how to best estimate that impact. A reasonable counterfactual 
is to assume that China has had the average global per capita growth (23 percent between 2008 and 
2013). In that case, global Gini would have been 63.9 against the actually recorded Gini of 61.6. This 
means that China’s above-average growth performance is responsible for the reduction of more than 2 
Gini points of global inequality, or in other worlds for almost ½ of the recorded decrease (the recorded 
decrease is 4.8 Gini points; see Table 6).13 
3. Growth incidence curves and inequality changes between 2008 and 2013 
The uneven regional growth rates, the continued catch-up of Asia, and generally quiescent 
within-national inequalities suggest both that the growth rates of different parts (percentiles) of the 
global income distribution were not the same and that the global growth incidence curve (GGIC) is likely 
to display pro-poor features (i.e., with growth rates higher among the poor percentiles than among the 
rich) principally on the account of slow growth in rich countries.  
 
13 Note that the assumed lower Chinese growth would, strictly speaking, reduce global mean growth too. So the 
counterfactual slightly underestimates the effects of high Chinese growth.  
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Figures 3 and 4 which display GGICs calculated respectively using household per capita income 
in PPP dollars and in nominal dollars14 show that  the globally poor and those who are around the global 
median had experienced especially strong growth.15  Using real PPP dollars, those around the median 
registered cumulative growth of about 60%, or almost 10% per annum over the five-year period. For 
those from the 82nd global income percentile all the way to the top, the cumulative growth between 
2008 and 2013 was below 20%. The lowest growth of all percentiles was registered by the very top of 
the global income distribution (6% in real terms). It is interestingly also the only global percentile that 
has registered merely a single-digit growth. Since the average growth rate  has been 23% (see Table 3), 
the share of the global top 1 percent has diminished from 13.2% to 11.4%. Likewise, the share of the top 
5% has gone down from 35.5% to 31.6%. As we have already seen, the overall distribution has become 
more equal; but it has become so in a specific way where the largest gains have been realized around 
the middle of the income distribution, or more exactly between the 35th and 70th percentile.   
The shape of GGIC, when the calculation is done using nominal US dollars, is very similar. (Note 
that the composition of the percentiles, that is of people included there, when percentiles are calculated 
using nominal US dollars will be different from the composition of the percentiles calculated by ranking 
people according to PPP dollars.)  The dip in the growth rate between the 10th and 40th percentile is now 
more pronounced, the growth is again the highest around the median of the global income distribution 
(reaching at the peak slightly over 70%, cumulatively), and again it goes down rather precipitously, 
moving into the negative territory around the 90th percentile. Percentiles 90-96 have all either zero or 
slightly negative growth: minus 1 to 2 percent. At the very top of the global income distribution, 
percentiles 99 and 100, had very modest cumulative grown rates of 2 and 3 percent. The shares of the 
top groups are, as expected, higher when we measure incomes in nominal dollars than in PPP dollars. 
They have nevertheless declined in dollar terms too. The top 5 percent received almost 45% of total 
global income in 2008; that share declined to 41%. The richest 1 percent share went down from 16% of 
global income to 15%. 
The growth incidence curves shown in Figures 3 and 4 are called “anonymous” because they 
compare income levels at a given percentile in two years regardless who is at that position. This means 
 
14 When we move from using PPP dollars to using nominal dollars not only do the growth rates change but the 
rankings of country/percentiles change as well (that is, the initial 2008 distribution is different when using nominal 
dollars rather than international dollars).    
 
15 Both graphs are unbalanced panels; they use all available surveys (136 in 2008 and 134 in 2013).  
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that generally not the same country/percentiles would be there in both years. For example, if Chinese 
percentiles grow at an above average rate they will move to the right (toward higher global percentiles) 
in 2013 than they were in 2008. We cannot of course have a full “non-anonymous” GGIC which would 
require that we keep all individuals at their 2008 positions and display their growth rates over the next 
five years. This is impossible because household surveys used here are not longitudinal and each survey, 
being a snapshot of that country’s distribution at a given point in time, will include different people.  
However (as in Lakner and Milanovic, 2016) we can define the “quasi non-anonymous” GGIC 
where we keep country/percentiles at their 2008 positions and calculate growth rates across such 
unchanged composition of each global percentile. 16  The “quasi-non-anonymous” GGIC is a balanced 
panel. This approach allows us to better know what groups of people have experienced particularly fast 
growth. The results are shown in Figure 5 (the data are in PPP dollars).17  The shape of the curve is 
similar to what we find in the case of anonymous growth: rather uniform increases of about 70% exist 
throughout the bottom half of the global population.  There is for example no indication of a U-shaped 
pattern among the lower global percentiles that we discerned in Figures 3 and 4. Around the median 
point of the 2008 global income distribution, the growth rate begins to decelerate, and it falls regularly 
after that point, reaching its lowest level, of only about 10%, for the richest ventile (5 percent of 
population) of the 2008 population.18  By definition, we know, that the growth rate of the top will 
always be the same or less if we compare non-anonymous to anonymous GIC.19  So, a part of the 
deceleration observed at the top is due to reshuffling. However, we have already seen in anonymous 
GICs and it is confirmed here that country/percentiles that were among the richest in 2008 had grown 
very slowly in the next five years.  
 
16 We did also a balanced anonymous panel but its results are very similar to the quasi non-anonymous balanced 
panel and thus not reported.  
   
17 The GGIC is ventile-based in order to provide a smoother curve. The composition of each 2008 global percentile 
is very heterogeneous (it normally includes percentiles from very diverse countries), and  the growth rates over the 
2008-13 period were also very different. Using ventiles gives a more “stylized” picture of the change. 
  
18 Note that the position on the income distribution, that is, the position on the horizontal axis reflects, in the case 
of non-anonymous GIC, the position at the initial period (2008). 
 
19 Non-anonymous top 1 percent can grow at the same rate as anonymous top 1 percent only if everybody who 
was originally in the top 1 percent remained there. If one or more persons dropped out, non-anonymous top 
growth must be less than anonymous.   
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What were the country/percentiles that belonged to the top 1 percent of the global income 
distribution in 2008 and what was their real growth experience? The overall growth of the 2008 top 1 
percent was 7.2%. More than ½ of the people in the global top 1 percent were Americans. They 
belonged to the top 11 American country/percentiles in 2008 and their cumulative growth rate in the 
following five years was between 5.5% and 7% with the exception of the top US percentile that 
registered a negative growth of 6%. It is remarkable that 15 million people out of 63 million that were in 
the global top 1 percent in 2008 experienced negative growth. They included the top decile (i.e. all ten 
percentiles) of the Canadian and Icelandic income distributions, the two top percentiles of the French, 
seven top percentile of the British, the very top of the Greek, Dutch and Italian income distributions, 20  
the top 4 percentiles in Taiwan. Overall, 87% of those who were (a) in the global top 1 percent in 2008, 
and (b) experienced negative growth subsequently were part of the WENAO rich world. For the global 
2008 ventile, that proportion is almost the same (86%). It thus clearly emerges that the significant 
slowdown in growth of the richest parts of the global distribution in 2008 was due to the negative 
income shock among the very tops of national income distributions in rich countries.    
  
 
20 Other top Greek and Italian percentiles also had negative growth but there were not part of the global top 1 
percent in 2008. 
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Figure 3.  Cumulative percentage growth of per capita income (in PPP dollars) at different points 
of the global income distribution 2008-13; full sample; unbalanced panel 
 
Figure 4.  Cumulative percentage growth of per capita income (in current US  dollars) 
at different points of the global income distribution, 2008-13; full sample; unbalanced panel 
 
Note: Figures 3 and 4 show cumulative growth between 2008 and 2013. Composition of global percentiles 
in the two figures is not the same; people who are in a given global percentile according to PPP dollars are not 
necessarily the same as people who are in that percentile according to US dollars.  
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 Figure 5.  Cumulative percentage growth of per capita income (in PPP dollars) 
at different points of the global income distribution, 2008-13; quasi-non-anonymous balanced 
panel 
 
 
Note: The graph shows cumulative income growth between 2008 and 2013 for twenty ventiles of global income 
distributions with each ventile’s composition (country/percentiles within it) “fixed” as it was in 2008. It thus shows 
the average growth of country/percentiles that were at a given position in 2008 over the next five years.  
 
 On the other hand, who were the country/deciles around the 40th to 50th global percentiles 
(“the global middle class”) that experienced the fastest growth between 2008 and 2013 (see Figure 5)? 
The  country/percentiles that were at that point of the global distribution were extremely varied:  there 
are no fewer than 110 countries with “representatives” among these almost 600 million people. And 
clearly not all of them had the average experience of that group, namely a cumulative growth of around 
70%.  As expected, the most important in terms of the population, are the Chinese country/percentiles 
(132 million people belonging to the Chinese country/percentiles 38 to 47), Indian (103 million people, 
belonging to Indian percentiles 75 to 83), Indonesian (47 million belonging to the Indonesian percentiles 
48 to 58), Nigerian (18 million people, Nigerian percentiles 67 to 78), and the Philippines 
(country/percentiles  47 to 60), Mexico (country/percentiles 25 to 35) and Vietnam (country/percentiles 
57 to 72) each of the latter three with 11 to 13 million people. Many of them indeed had high growth 
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rates. For the Chinese country/percentiles the average cumulative growth was 133%, for the Indian 
102%, Vietnam 123%. One should not forget however how heterogeneous were experiences of that 
group—despite the fact that on average its incomes rose very rapidly. Thus, for example, the cumulative 
growth of the Nigerians who belonged there was -14% , and of Mexicans only +12%. In other words, the 
middle of the global income distribution that on average grew very fast between 2008 and 2013, was 
extremely diverse. As already mentioned, it included people from more than 100 countries and it would 
be wrong to generalize that there was something unique to that group that made it prosper. It probably 
included dissimilar people from various countries (only their incomes were similar) and it can be 
hypothesized that their fortunes were to a large degree determined by the economic experience of the 
countries where they lived. The fact that the bulk of the population there lived in Asian countries which 
experienced fast growth made also incomes of “the global middle class” increase, on average, more 
than the incomes of the rest of the global income distribution.   
4. Correcting for the underestimation of top incomes 
 There are two ways to adjust global income distribution for underreporting of top incomes in  
individual countries’ surveys. The first was used by Lakner and Milanovic (2013, 2016) who, using 
national decile data only, did two adjustments: the first was to “extend” the individual country 
distributions, using estimated Pareto relationship, to the top 5 percent and top 1 percent. This was the 
method first suggested by Atkinson (2007). In addition, Lakner and Milanovic used the gap between 
consumption from national accounts and income or consumption from household surveys and allocated 
it to the top decile, top ventile and top 1 percent  using the same Pareto relationship. The latter 
procedure was termed by them “top-heavy adjustment [because the entire gap was allocated to the top 
decile] with Pareto tail”.21   
Another methodology was used by Anand and Segal (2015, 2017). For the countries (group A) 
for which the authors had information on the top 1 percent of fiscal incomes they replaced the top 1 
percent shares from household surveys by the corresponding (top 1 percent) shares from fiscal data. For 
the bulk of countries  which indeed lack fiscal data (group B), they imputed the estimated top 1 percent 
shares based on the relationship between surveys’  top 10 percent and fiscal top 1 percent obtained 
 
21 There were some additional ad hoc adjustments to that methodology such as setting limits to the amount of the 
gap, so that in some cases where the NA/HS gap was extremely high, the adjustment not be unreasonable.    
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from group A countries.22  Anand and Segal’s goal was to look at the global top 1 percent rather than at 
the whole distribution and thus their correction was concerned with the national top 1 percents only.23 
The method implies that the entire underestimation comes from the underestimation of national top 1 
percents.24 This may be, at times, considered too restrictive (see Yonzan et al, forthcoming). 
 The reason why global income distribution cannot be corrected the way it is done at times for 
individual countries (e.g.  for the UK, see Office of National Statistics, 2020; Jenkins 2017; Burkhauser et 
al., 2018; for the United States, see Burkhauser et al. 2008) is because national corrections take 
advantage of the existence of the very detailed fiscal data that are then combined with equally detailed, 
and often “corrected” or reweighted, household survey data. But majority of countries do not assess 
direct taxes in addition to payroll or wage taxes withdrawn at source and thus fiscal data are seldom 
compiled. Moreover, even when they are compiled they fail to account for the bulk of the working 
population in countries with large informal sectors. For other countries (e.g. India, China, Russia), fiscal 
data refer to a very small part of the population: around 0.2% in China (Piketty, Yang and Zucman, 2019; 
Additional Table T11), between 0.5% and 3%, and only since 2010, about 6% in India (Chancel and 
Piketty, 2019, Figure 4); less than 1% in Russia (Novokmet, Piketty and Zucman, 2018; online appendix 
Table P2-12).25 This means that when studies for these countries are made, most of the time around 
99% of the data points are derived from household surveys.26  Moreover, the definitions of income and 
recipients (tax units, households, or individuals) from fiscal and household data are as a rule different 
and that they cannot be compared unless much more information and micro data are available. 
Attaching an income share derived from a national and changing definition of income made for tax 
 
22 This, not fully intuitive, approach is based on the observed relationship that “the income share of the top 10% in 
the household survey data is strongly correlated with the income share of the top 1% in the independently-
estimated top incomes [fiscal] dataset” (Anand and Segal, 2017, p. 13).  
23 In Anand and Segal (2017), the top 10 percent is also smoothed using a Pareto adjustment.  
 
24 There is also a third approach used by Alvaredo et al. (2018) which also combines household survey and fiscal 
data. However, their sample size (the number of actual countries included) is small, there are many extrapolations, 
and the method is not clearly explained. 
 
25 In Russia, for example, individuals subject to direct taxes that are reported in government’s tabulations of tax-
payers, are only those with very high incomes above an annually established threshold. All others are subject only 
to the 13% direct tax withdrawn at source and are not included in fiscal tabulations.   
 
26 Even for Brazil where direct taxation is more widespread, only 20% of the population is covered by tax data (see  
Blanchet et al, 2018, Figure 8, p. 20).  
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purposes and assessed across idiosyncratic tax units to a distribution of individuals ranked according to 
an internationally-defined post-tax income is very questionable. It is clear that a detailed attempts to 
adjust HS data by using fiscal information—which itself suffers from many problems (changeable 
definitions of income, inconsistent recipient units) can only be applied to a small subset of rich 
countries. And even in that case, it cannot be consistent across countries and even across time. 
 To adjust global income distribution, by  correcting for national income underestimations, one 
therefore needs to apply a method that can be used for all countries and that would be, by necessity, 
much “rougher”. We have decided to correct top ten percentiles of each country’s distribution by 
augmenting their incomes by the ratio between mean household private consumption from NA and 
mean  income/consumption from surveys. If survey mean is 80% of per capita private consumption, the 
ratio NS/HS is 1.25 (1/0.8) and all top ten percentiles of that country’s distribution are multiplied by 
1.25.  Other than being straightforward to apply to all countries the method has two advantages. First, it 
uses the gap between national accounts and HS as a measure (indicator) of underreporting. Second, 
while it never fully “exhausts” that  gap it exhausts more of it in the case of countries with recorded 
greater inequality.27 Indeed as shown in Figure 6, the NA-HS gap is increasing in recorded inequality. 
More unequal countries will tend to have a higher top decile share; therefore, more of the overall gap 
will be allocated to it. For example, if the top decile receives one-half of total HS reported income, then 
the adjustment will involve one-half of the gap.28   
  
 
27 Lakner and Milanovic (2016) method mentioned above was exhausting the entire gap by definition. 
  
28 The adjusted income of i-th percentile (yi*) can be written 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝑦𝑖 ( 𝑐𝑚) if i>90 and 𝑐𝑚 > 1 where yi is unadjusted 
income of one of the top ten percentiles, c=mean per capita household private consumption from national 
accounts, and m=mean per capita income (consumption) from household surveys. If we write the unadjusted 
income as a product of that percentile’s share in total income and HS, so that 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝑚 ∗ 𝑠𝑖 ( 𝑐𝑚) we easily notice 
that the adjustment will be greater as the  share of a given top percentile is greater (and thus recorded inequality 
is greater) and survey’s underestimation of the mean compared to national accounts is greater.   
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The method therefore uses two important pieces of information: the NA-HS gap, and recorded 
inequality. Both of them can be reasonably expected to be correlated with (the unobserved) 
underreporting of top incomes. To be clear, this approach implicitly argues that (a) the higher the NA-HS 
gap, the greater is top income underreporting, and (b) the higher the measured top income shares, the 
greater part of the gap is explained by the top income underreporting.29 
It may be interesting to show how much the adjustment increases Ginis and top 1 percent and 
top 10 percent shares of selected countries in 2013 (see Table 7).30 For the United States, for example, 
the adjusted Gini is 47 vs. the unadjusted (household-survey based) Gini of 41. For Mexico that has 
historically displayed a very large gap between national accounts and household survey data31, Gini goes 
up from 50 to 66.  The shares of the top 1 percent and top 10 percent likewise increase significantly: the 
top 1 percent share for Mexico goes up from less than 13% to more than 19%, while the top decile share 
increases from 40% to 62%. As Table 7 illustrates, there are sizeable adjustments for all high inequality 
countries like India, Brazil and South Africa. The adjustments are significant, but less, for urban 
Indonesia and Russia. For Germany and China where the gap between NA and HS is almost non-existent, 
the unadjusted and adjusted Ginis, as well as the top shares, are the same. 
  
 
29 We are basically looking at the correlates of an unobserved variable (top underreporting) and assume that it is 
positively associated with the overall NA-HS gap and with recorded inequality. This is different from, even if related 
to, the approach used by Deaton’s (2005). According to Deaton the log ratio between the observed 
(“uncorrected”) mean from household surveys and “true” mean (which we assume to be from NA) is  
 𝑙𝑛 (𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 ) = 𝑙𝑛 𝑒𝜇−𝛼𝜎2𝑒𝜇 = ln(𝑒−𝛼𝜎2) = −𝛼𝜎2   
   
where μ=the “true” mean, σ=the “true” standard deviation of log incomes, and incomes are assumed to be 
distributed lognormally. The equation implies that in “truly” more unequal countries we should expect greater 
underestimation of the mean and hence higher NA-HS values.   
 
30 Similar adjustment is of course conducted for 2008.  
 
31 In both years, household survey mean is only around 40% of national accounts’ mean.  
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Figure 6. Gap between the average private household consumption from  
national accounts and household survey mean and measured Gini 
 
Note: Years 2008 and 2013. The gap is equal to 1-(NA mean/HS mean). Only positive gaps displayed.  
 
 
  When we compare the adjusted Ginis and top shares obtained here with independent detailed 
country estimates that combine survey and tax data, and use similar definitions of income (disposable 
income) and recipients (persons) as here, the differences in the estimates are small.32 For the United 
States, the increase in our adjusted Gini compared to the unadjusted one matches almost exactly the 
similar estimate for the US inequality obtained by Korinek et al. (2005) when they account for non-
compliance (refusal to participate in surveys) and  income underreporting.33 Our US adjusted Gini is 
slightly higher (and the adjusted top 1 percent slightly lower) than the corresponding survey-cum-fiscal 
estimates made by the US Congressional Budget Office (2014). Similar estimates that combine survey 
and fiscal data for the UK also give results very close to our adjusted values. It is only for China and 
 
32 We do not contrast the results with top income shares derived from fiscal data only because their definition of 
income and recipients is different from is used here. 
 
33 They find that the US Gini goes up by almost 5 points; we find here the increase of 6 Gini points.  
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Russia where the closest comparable estimates cover only adult population and include the (very 
roughly) imputed value of undisbursed corporate profits that the top 1 percent shares exceed 
significantly the ones we obtain  here.34 
Table 7. Gini, top 1 percent and top 10 percent shares with unadjusted and adjusted data 
(selected countries, year 2013) 
 
 Gini Top 1 percent share Top 10 percent share 
 Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 
  Here Other   Here Other   Here 
Germany 31 34  5.4 6.2  24.9 28.5 
UK 35 38 35a 6.3 7.3 7.5a 27.3 31.7 
USA 41 47 44d 6.8 8.9 10d 30.0 39.3 
Russia 41 47  7.0 8.7 20.2e 32.5 40.1 
Indonesia-urban 43 55  8.2 12.2  33.4 49.9 
China 43 43  6.4 6.4 13.9c 30.5 30.5 
Mexico 50 66  12.6 19.2  40.5 62.2 
India 51 59  11.3 14.6  40.0 52.0 
Brazil 52 57 61b 11.4 13.4  40.9 47.9 
South Africa 66 72  15.7 19.2  52.9 64.5 
Note: Countries ranked by unadjusted Gini (from the least unequal to the most unequal). Top 10 percent and top 1 
percent share as in percent of global income. a/ UK, Office for National Statistics (2020, Figure 6 and 7, pp. 12-13; 
year 2013-14).  b/ Brazil, Blanchet et al. (2018, Figure A-6, p. 50; year 2013). c/ China, Piketty et al. (2017, Table 2, 
year 2015), per adult; includes imputed income from undisbursed corporate profits. d/ US, Congressional Budget 
Office (2014), Figure 6, p. 16 and Figure 14, p. 26; year 2011). e/ Russia, Novokmet et al. (2018, Table 1, p. 186), 
per adult; includes imputed income from undistributed corporate profits. 
 
 When we perform the adjustment, although it relates only to the top ten percentiles of each 
country, the changes affect many parts of the global income distribution. Consider for example the 
adjustment for Mexico. Its top ten percentiles, using unadjusted data, span the range from the 79th to 
the 100th global percentile (the Mexican top 1 percent is part of the global top 1 percent). As their 
incomes are increased, they will tend to move to higher or lower global percentiles (depending also on 
what happens to other countries’ top ten percentiles) and that movement, and the implicit reranking, 
will affect mean incomes of global percentiles. Since the upward income adjustment in the case of 
Mexico is very significant, its top ten percentiles now span the range from the 93rd to the 100th global 
percentile. In other words, people who are around the top decile threshold in Mexico (national 
percentile 91) are no longer estimated to be at the level of the global 79th percentile but the global 93rd 
 
34 Information on company ownership and thus on the part of corporate profit that belongs to various individuals is 
either unavailable or cannot be linked to the fiscal  (or survey) data. The authors therefore assume that ownership 
of unobserved undistributed profits mimics ownership of observed capital income.   
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percentile. Conversely, for Sweden, where the adjustment was zero, some of its top percentiles will slide 
in global ranking by 1 percentile (from 99th to 98th). What is important to emphasize is that national top 
adjustments will have implication not only for the top of the global income distribution but for different 
parts of the global distribution, including even low or middle global percentiles. In other words, global 
reranking due to national top income adjustments may be significant.   
Figure 7 shows the changes at the global level caused by the adjustment.  The overall global 
income increases, on account of adjustment, by 11% in 2008 and 6% in 2013.  As can be seen, the 
effects span the entire distribution but unevenly: for low global percentiles, as expected, the 
adjustments are practically non-existent, often less than 1%. When they are positive it is due to some 
top percentiles of  poor African countries “escaping” from these low global percentiles upwards, and the 
new country/percentiles “falling” into those low global percentiles being richer than the “escapees” 
were originally. The effects around the 70th-80th global percentile are more important: an increase of 
around 5% and even 10%. In 2008,  a large increase in that portion of the global income distribution is 
almost entirely due to the upward readjustment of the Indian top ten percentiles. For the very top of 
the global income distribution, the adjustment gains are, as expected, quite significant: income of the 
percentile 99 increases by 10% in 2008 and 15% in 2013, while the global top 1 percent gains 33% in 
2008 and 42% in 2013.  
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Figure 7. Income change (in percent), at different percentiles of the global income distribution, 
due to the adjustment for underestimation of the tops of national income distributions 
 
Note: The graph shows how much income of a given percentile of global income distribution is changed 
when an adjustment (described in the text) for the underestimation of the top 10 percent of national income 
distribution is conducted. People who are in a given global percentile before and after the adjustment are not 
necessarily the same because the adjustment affects ranks of the groups whose incomes are changed.  
   
 What happens to the new GGIC will therefore depend on how global distributions are affected 
by the adjustments in both 2008 and 2013. Figure 8 shows the new adjusted global growth incidence 
curve against the unadjusted GGIC. Income gains up to the 60th percentile are the same. The global 
median, for example, is up 57% between 2008 and 2013 whether we use adjusted or unadjusted data. 
After approximately the 60th global percentile, the adjusted GGIC shows smaller gains which however 
reverse for the global top 5 percent that, according to the adjusted data, appear to have gained more 
than without the adjustment. Note that this means that our adjustment of top national incomes has 
been more “pro-rich” in 2013 than in 2008.   
The “adjusted” curve continues to display its distinct “inverted U” shape that was found for the 
period 1988-2008 by  Milanovic (2012) and Lakner and Milanovic (2016). However, the gains of the top 
compared to the highest gains which are still registered around the median of the global income 
distribution are much less than in the 1988-2008 period. In that period, the average annual per capita 
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real growth of the global top 1 percent was very close to the growth of the median (2.5%  vs. 2.8%; 
Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, Table 3, p. 216). This is what gave to the curve its upward trunk-like tick for 
highest incomes. Here, even after the top adjustment, the average annual growth of the global top 1 
percent (2.5%) remains significantly below the growth of the median (9.4%), and even below the growth 
rate of the mean (3.3%). This implies a diminished share of the global top 1 percent even with the 
adjusted data.      
 The adjustment brings two important messages: first, the “correction” of national tops affects 
not only the top of the global income distribution but the entire distribution; second, it more than 
doubles the estimate of the global top 1 percent income growth from 6% to 13% over the five-year 
period, but still fails to bring it close to the growth rate of the median.   
Figure 8. Global growth incidence curve with national top income adjustments and without adjustments 
(cumulative growth 2008-13, in percent, in international dollars; full anonymous sample) 
 
 
Note: This is a comparison of global income-adjusted and non-adjusted (reported) global GICs, both based on the 
full sample of countries. 
 
 How do various ways of looking at global distribution of income affect our results? Table 8 gives 
a summary of growth rates at different percentiles of the global income distribution, shares of the top 1 
and top 10 percent, and two synthetic measures of inequality (Gini and Theil (0)) for each of the four 
different ways of assessing global income distribution. Here are some conclusions: 
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1. Bottom quintile and bottom half of the income distribution have gained income shares under 
all scenarios. 
2. Top 5 percent and top 1 percent have lost income shares under all scenarios. The loss of the 
top 1 percent share is the least (only 0.7 percentage points) when we adjust for top income 
underestimation. In other cases, the loss ranges between 1.4 and 1.9 percentage points. However, even 
in the most favorable case for the very rich, top 1 growth at best parallels mean income growth (a 
condition needed to keep the share constant) but falls way behind the growth around the global 
median. This however was not the case in the 1988-2008 period. There is therefore a perceptible 
slowdown in the growth of highest incomes. The global financial crisis that hit the rich countries much 
more than the rest of the world is the main reason behind the slowdown.  
3. Gini and Theil indices decreased in all cases, and the differences between the scenarios are  
not very substantial. Global Gini in PPP dollar terms is in 2013 between 61 and 64 points, higher than in 
any individual country, save South Africa,35 but below its 2008 level by between 4 or 5 points.  As usual, 
inequality measured by dollar incomes is much higher. The difference between global inequality in 
dollar terms and in PPP terms is about 10 Gini points. Global nominal dollar inequality of around 73 Gini 
points is at a level that is beyond anything we observe in individual countries.  
  
 
35 South Africa’s Gini, highest in the world are 70 in 2008 and 66 in 2013.  
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Table 8. Income growth at different parts of the global income distribution and measures of inequality 
 Unadjusted national household survey data Top-adjusted 
national surveys 
 Full sample; 
anonymous, real 
PPP dollars 
Full sample; 
anonymous, 
nominal US dollars 
Balanced sample, 
quasi non-
anonymous; real 
PPP dollars 
Full sample; 
anonymous, real 
PPP dollars 
 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 
Income shares 
(in %) 
        
Bottom 20 
percent 
1.6 2.0 0.6 0.9 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.8 
Bottom half 8.4 10.4 3.7 5.3 8.4 11.1 7.6 9.7 
Top 5 percent 35.5 31.6 44.7 41.0 35.5 30.3 37.8 36.3 
Top 1 percent  13.2 11.4 16.4 15.0 13.2 11.1 15.7 15.0 
Inequality         
Gini 66.4 61.6 77.5 72.7 66.4 60.3 68.2 64.2 
Theil (0) 91.0 75.9 149.0 120.8 90.8 71.0 97.8 83.0 
Cumulative 
growth 2008-
13 (in %) at:  
        
10th percentile 47 56 68 47 
30th percentile 48 54 66 48 
Median 57 73 78 57 
70th percentile 45 54 56 37 
Mean 22 11 27 18 
90th percentile  15 -1 11 14 
95th percentile 12 0 11 12 
Top 1 percent 6 2 7 13 
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5. Selected national percentiles: their global position and growth between 2008 and 2013 
a. Global position of some country/percentiles  
Global income distribution data allows us to do a number of important calculations. One of their 
advantages is that they let us place individual countries’ distributions in their global context. Figure 9 
shows one such comparison where national income percentiles are displayed along the horizontal axis, 
and their position in the global income distribution is shown on the vertical axis. (Income is throughout 
defined as disposable household per capita income or consumption in benchmark year 2013 expressed 
in $PPP.) This is almost equivalent  to testing for the first-order stochastic dominance except that it is 
done not by comparing incomes directly but indirectly through the global percentile position to which a 
given income level corresponds.36  For example, a person at the median income level in the United 
States (x=50) has an income level that places him/her at the 93rd global income percentile. Even the 
poorest Americans have, as the figure shows, an income that puts them above the global median (i.e. 
above y=50). We also note that Russia dominates, at any income percentile except the very top, Brazil 
and China, and also that latter two countries are practically undistinguishable all the way to the national 
80th percentile, after which Brazilians are richer than the Chinese. In other words, the top quintile of the 
Brazilians are richer than the equivalent top quintile of the Chinese. Indians are poorer, at any point of 
national distributions, than the equivalently placed people in other countries shown here but at the very 
top of the income distribution, the richest 1 percent of Indians are at the (very high) 94th global 
percentile. Similar graphs can be constructed using any group among more than 130 countries included 
in 2013.   
Another way to look at the world is to compare median incomes. This is a comparison which is  
arguably more meaningful than the comparison of average incomes. The comparison of medians 
however can only be done if we have access to micro (household survey) data, that is to national 
distributions.  For example, after-tax per capita income at the US median is $PPP 18,200 per year; a 
person at the equivalent Chinese urban median has $PPP 5,400 and a person at the Indian urban median 
has only $PPP 1,600. Therefore, the ratio between US (de facto urban since most of the US population 
lives in urban areas) and Chinese urban incomes, at the median point, is more than 3 to 1, and is almost 
12 to 1 with respect to urban India.  
 
36 This ordinal comparison however is a blunter instrument than the strict first-order stochastic dominance since 
two somewhat different incomes can be placed in the same global percentile.   
 
32 
 
Similarly, we can look at the average income of the Chinese urban top 1 percent: it is equal to 
the average income of Americans situated at the 85th national percentile. Thus the richest urban Chinese 
have, on average, a standard of living of the American upper middle class. 
Obviously, similar calculations can be made for the lower ends of national income distributions. 
Thus, more than 70% of the Malagasy population lives on an income lower than the World Bank global 
poverty line of $PPP 1.9 per day (not shown here). But even the poorest people in Denmark have an 
income that is three times higher than that; moreover their  income would place the poorest people in 
Denmark at the 98th  (sic) percentile of Madagascar’s income distribution. We thus get a much greater 
insight into the enormity of income gaps that exist between nations and between income groups. Very 
often, as in the previous example, the poorest West Europeans or Americans would, if placed in an 
African income distribution, be among the top  percentiles.  
 
Figure 9. Position of national income percentiles in the global distribution 
 
Note: the graph contrasts the percentile positions of a given group in national and global income distributions. For 
example, the fiftieth US percentile (US median; on the horizontal axis) is relatively rich in global terms and is 
located at the 93rd  global percentile (vertical axis). The opposite is true for India  All amounts used to rank the 
percentiles are in PPP dollars.  
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Decomposing populations of very large countries like India, China and Indonesia into their urban 
and rural parts is useful for two reasons: first, these populations often enjoy significantly different 
standards of living even when the PPP exchange rates used for rural population are lower than those 
used for the urban population (and thus adjust for the differential in the price level), and second, we are 
dealing there with large numbers of people representing an important share of the world population 
(the three countries together include almost 2.9 billion people or 43% of the total population included in 
2013). It is thus helpful to present a more finely-grained picture that that of national percentiles.  
Figure 10 shows the position of urban and rural parts of India and China together with  Brazil (as 
a whole country) displayed for comparative purposes. We note that incomes in urban China are higher 
than in Brazil throughout most of income distribution and that only after the 89th percentile Brazilian 
incomes become higher. China urban and China rural are almost two different countries: not only is a 
person at a given urban percentile always better off than a person at an equivalent rural percentile, but 
that difference (as we can see from Table 8) is particularly high among the poor. A person at the 10th 
urban percentile is 26 global percentage points better off than the person at the 10th rural percentile 
and is more similar, it her income level, to the person who is at the rural median.  Nevertheless China’s 
rural distribution does dominate Indian urban distribution until the very high parts of the distribution, 
and not surprisingly, is first-order dominant over the Indian rural population. 37  
  
 
37 Chinese rural incomes exceed Indian rural incomes by the ratio between 2 and 4 at all income percentiles except 
the top 5 percent where the ratio is less than 2. The gap is the least at the top 1 percent level where Chinese 
incomes are only 24% higher than Indian.   
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Figure 10. Position of national rural and urban income percentiles in global income distribution 
 
Note: the graph contrasts the percentile positions of a given group in national and global income distributions. For 
example, the fiftieth Chinese urban percentile (on the horizontal axis) is relatively rich in global terms and is 
located at the 70th  global percentile (vertical axis). The opposite is true for rural India  All amounts used to rank the 
percentiles are in PPP dollars.  
 
Table 9 reveals further remarkable differences  that exist between countries: thus the people at 
the 10th  rural India’s percentile are at the 3rd global percentile (thus among the poorest people in the 
world) while equivalently positioned Americans (at the tenth national percentile) are richer than ¾ of 
the world population. The ordinal differences at the very tops of national income distributions are much 
less, with every top 1 percent shown in Table 8 (except for rural Indian) being in the top global decile.   
Table 9 allows us to look at what may be termed heterogeneities within the lower and upper 
parts of national income distributions (measured respectively by the distance in global percentile points 
between the national median and the national bottom tenth percentile, and the national median and 
the national 90th percentile).  Brazil stands out by the heterogeneity in the bottom of its distribution 
such that the median of its income distribution is much higher than the tenth percentile; rural China 
comes close second. What this statistic reveals in effect is extreme poverty of the lowest parts of income 
distributions in rural China and Brazil.   
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When it comes to the heterogeneity among the rich, India (both urban and rural) and urban 
Indonesia stand apart from the others: the high end of their distributions (90th percentile) is significantly 
richer than the median. In effect, the gap of over 30 global percentile points represents a gap of almost 
2 billion people. In other words, if everybody in the world were ranked according to their per capita real 
income there would be  some 2 billion people between a relatively rich person at the 90th percentile in 
urban India (or urban Indonesia) and a person at their respective areas’ medians. Differently, the US, on 
account of its high income throughout, stands at the other extreme: the gap among the people in the 
upper part of US income distribution is, in global ordinal terms, small since even those at the US income 
median are at a high worldwide position. The ordinal difference between the US 90th  and 99th 
percentiles is non-existent reflecting the fact that 11 highest US percentiles are all in the global top 1 
percent. Now, incomes of the people who are in the top American decile obviously differ.  Yet the fact 
that they all “inhabit” the same global percentile probably has implications on their consumption 
patterns, interests, and how they perceive themselves and the rest of the world.  Global positioning, 
while not researched (not least because of lack of adequate data)  is unlikely to be irrelevant, especially 
in an era of globalization.    
Table 9. Global positions of various national (rural and urban) income percentiles 
 Brazil China 
urban 
China 
rural 
India 
urban 
India 
rural 
Indonesia 
urban 
Indonesia 
rural 
USA 
10th percentile 28 46 20 10 3 22 16 76 
Median 63 70 52 36 19 44 32 93 
75th percentile 77 80 62 54 35 61 44 98 
90th percentile 88 87 73 69 51 74 55 100 
Top 1 percent 100 99 94 97 92 97 85 100 
Heterogeneity  
of the bottom 
(the median to 
bottom 10%) 
35 24 32 16 16 22 16 17 
Heterogeneity  
of the rich (90th 
percentile to 
the median) 
25 17 21 33 32 30 23 7 
Note: “Heterogeneity of the bottom” shows the gap between the global ordinal position of the median and 10th 
percentile. “Heterogeneity of the rich” shows the gap between the global ordinal position of the rich and the 
median.   
 
b. Slowdown of Western growth 
 We have already mentioned the difference of national growth experiences during the period 
under study here. Figure 11 shows national GICs for China, India, US and Germany with cumulative 
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growth rates over the period 2008-13. The bottom Chinese income percentiles have seen their real 
income more than double while the richest percentiles gained about 80%. The growth has thus been 
broadly pro-poor. Indian growth has on the contrary been pro-rich, with low incomes growing at 50-55% 
and top incomes at more than 70%.  American growth was much slower throughout with most of the 
population gaining about 5%, and the top 1 percent losing 5%. Finally, German growth was pro-rich up 
to the 80th percentile, with gains ranging between 10% and 20%; at the very top though, like in the 
United States, growth was much less (although still positive).  The median-income person in China 
gained about 120% compared to her 2008 income; the median person in India saw her income rise by 
about 60%; but in rich countries, the increases were much more modest: about 15% in Germany and 
only 5% in the United States. Even the most successful percentiles in the US and Germany  have grown 
at slower rates that the least successful percentiles in India and China. It is these broad-based large 
differences in real growth that are the main engine behind the reduction of global inequality discussed 
in Sections 2 and 3.   
Figure 11. National growth incidence curves, 2008-2013 
 
Note: The vertical axis show cumulative income growth between 2008 and 2013. Value of 0.05 is 5% 
growth. The scales of the four graphs are different to better highlight growth rates of the countries.  
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6. Looking ahead 
 The global financial crisis and the recession that followed were a huge shock to the system that 
existed roughly from the mid-1980s to 2008. But the effects of the crisis were uneven, both across 
countries and income groups. The Global Recession was much stronger in the rich countries than in the 
“emerging” Asia and this fact was sufficient to make global income inequality continue on its downward 
trajectory on which it was since the  turn of the century. Moreover, it even accelerated it as both India 
and China continued to grow strongly and within-national inequalities in most countries were quiescent.  
However, unlike during the previous two decades, the slowdown in the rich world (and no perceptible 
increase of inequality in these countries) affected income growth of the global top 1 percent which still 
continues to be populated mostly by the richest people from the rich countries. Unlike in the case of the 
“elephant chart” that very vividly caught the evolution of global distribution between 1988 and 2008, 
and where both the plutocratic top of the distribution and the “new Asian middle class” grew at 
approximately the same rates, in the period 2008-2013, the top of the global income distribution grew 
cumulatively only by about 10%  in real terms vs. more than 50% for the middle of the global income 
distribution. Even when we adjust highest national incomes for the likely underestimation, the growth of 
the top of the global pyramid increases to about 12-13% which is still far below the growth of the 
middle. This was one of the major effects of the global financial crisis: it arrested the exceptionally fast 
income growth of the richest people in the world. But it did not perceptibly affect convergence of mean 
country incomes, nor did it improve the relative position of Western middle classes whose income 
growth continued to be sluggish and to lag behind the world median.      
 Will these trends change as an even greater crisis of covid-19 pandemic hits the world? At the 
time of writing (June 2020) it is much too early to come up with any reasonable estimates of covid-19 
effects. We do not know how long the economic downturn will continue since it is largely a function of 
our ability to control the virus, nor how will the epidemic, and hence economic misery, spread around 
the world. The first results indicate a continuation of the positive growth gap between China and the 
West which is, as we have seen, the same evolution that largely shaped global inequality in the past four 
decades. However, the virus’s effect on other poor and middle income countries like India, Brazil, 
Nigeria, Congo,  Indonesia etc. is difficult to predict. If growth rates of these countries slow down, and 
even more so, if they move into the negative growth territory, global convergence may be checked and 
even overturned. There is a small, seemingly technical, issue such that with negative growth of many 
rich countries, the global mean income will be reduced; that might place China’s mean income above 
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the global mean and at that position Chinese superior growth begins to have very small and ultimately 
positive (inequality-increasing) impact on global inequality. The role of India’s growth, so far the second 
most important engine of global income reduction (after China), then becomes crucial. If India’s growth, 
whether because of covid-19 or other reasons, sputters, international (population-weighted) 
convergence may come to an end.  If we add the likelihood of rising domestic inequalities due to the 
disproportionate income and employment loss of the poorer sections of national populations, we may 
easily come  to the conclusion that the forces unleased by the pandemic seem to be arrayed against 
further convergence of incomes among people and among countries of the world. This however may be 
a somewhat pessimistic conclusion based on the first-round effects of the pandemic. We may be able to 
speak more conclusively about the global consequence of the pandemic only after a few years, and 
hopefully by then, the world, and especially the middle-income and poor countries, may be back to the 
trajectory at which they were when the pandemic struck. But what is clear already now is that the world 
has suffered a very strong shock and that the effects on the global income distribution are likely be felt 
for a long time even if we cannot yet measure them.   
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Annex 1. Data sources (number of surveys) used to create global income distributions in 2008 and 2013 
 2008 2013 
Individual countries’ household surveys 26 3 
POVCAL (World Bank) 22 68 
SILC (Eurostat) 21 7 
World Bank Africa harmonized surveys 21 2 
SEDLAC (Latin America harmonized 
surveys) 
18 15 
LIS 17 38 
Europe Central Asia (World Bank 
database; harmonized surveys) 
11 0 
Total 136 133 
 
Note: Data for 2013 include rural and urban surveys for China, India and Indonesia.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
